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 The Domino Logic of the Darkest Moment
 The Fall of Singapore, the Atlantic Echo Chamber, and
 ' Chinese Penetration ' In u. s. Cold War Policy toward Southeast Asia
 Wen-Qing Ngoei
 Northwestern University
 WenQingNgoei2oi4@iLnorthwestern. edu
 Abstract
 This essay argues that Anglo-American memories of Japan's victory in Singapore in
 1942, which British Prime Minister Winston Churchill labeled Britain's "darkest
 moment" in World War II, soon would underpin the domino logic within u.s. Cold War
 strategy. For both American and British policymakers, Japan's war machine had fused
 together in interconnected insecurity the bastions of Euro-American colonial power.
 In Southeast Asia, it had imposed the condition that one state's vulnerabilities
 impinged upon the stability of its neighbor. This vision of Southeast Asia's intercon-
 nected insecurity was central to the domino logic within u.s. Cold War policy, u.s.
 policymakers' preoccupation with containing communism in Vietnam arose signifi-
 cantly from how Japan had torn into Southeast Asia from Indochina. After World War
 II, u.s. and British policymakers perceived Southeast Asian insecurity through both
 the prism of Japanese imperialism and their fears of an older "Yellow Peril" - China
 and Southeast Asia's Chinese diaspora. Indeed, u.s. and British officials anticipated, as
 well as echoed and confirmed, each other's suspicions that China and its diaspora
 would collaborate to reprise Japan's campaign.
 Keywords
 domino theory - Chinese diaspora - Japanese imperialism - Anglo-American Cold
 War policy - race and empire - colonial order - Chinese Communists
 At midnight on 8 December 1941, the 25th Imperial Japanese Army shelled
 the northern coast of British Malaya to commence its invasion of the colony.
 Two hours later, at dawn on the day of "infamy," Japan attacked u.s. military
 © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2014 | DOI 10.1163/18765610-02103001
 (*)
 'i O
 BRILL
 Il II |< >1 UN 'l ( >1
 Wll KM W-l 'M 'sl ''
 lvi I ' 1 1« >'n
 brill.com/jaer
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Sat, 18 Apr 2020 02:53:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 2i6 ngoei
 installations at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines to immobilize the U.S.
 Fleet in the Eastern Pacific.1 With that accomplished, Japan could push freely
 southward to Singapore.2 That same day, Japanese bombers str ck Singapore,
 the islan  that - for its $400 million naval a d air bases - British strategists
 had called e Empi e's "impregnable fortress" in East Asia.3 Over the next
 three days, Japan's forces would hit U.S. military bases on Midway and in the
 P ilippines, occupy Guam, and sink the 35,000-ton British battleship Pri ce of
 Wales a d the battle cruiser Repulse just off the Malay peninsula.4 Japanese
 tanks plowed through the Malayan jungles, joined by troops deploying from
 occupied bases and airfi lds in French Ind china and Thailand.5 As British
 and Australian forces etreated, Japanese engineers a  infantrymen raced on
 bicycles down Malaya's highways toward Si apore.6 With alarm, the New Y rk
 For their invaluable help and encouragement with this article, the author thanks his
 colleagues and advisors in the Department of History at Northwestern University, as well as
 readers at the Cold War History Research Seminar that the Internatio al History Department
 of the London School of Economics and Political Science organized.
 1 Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Guam Bombed; Army Ship is Sunk," New York Times [hereafter ny
 Times], 8 December 1941, p. 1; "u.s. and Japs at War," Chicago Daily Tribune [hereafter Chicago
 ribune], 8 December 1941, 1; John Burton, Fortnight of Infamy: The Collapse of Allied Airpower
 West of Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, md: Naval Institute Publishing, 2006), 91, 324 n4. John
 Burton states that in 1941, Hawaiian time was thirty minutes behind its current setting. Thus,
 midnight on 8 December 1941 for Malaya and Singapore would have been 5:30 a.m. on
 7 December in Hawaii. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 a.m., Hawaii time.
 2 "Drive on Singapore," ny Times, 20 December 1941, p. C18.
 3 Brian P. Farrell, "Bitter Harvest: The Defense and Fall of Singapore" in Malcolm H. Murfett,
 John N. Miksie, Brian P. Fa rell, C iang Ming Shun, eds., Between Two Oceans: A ilitary
 History of Singapo e from Fi st Settlement to Final British Withdrawal (Singapore: Oxford
 University Press, 1999), 198; See, for example, W. David Mclntyre, "The Strategic Significance
 of Singapore, 1917-1942: The Naval Base and the Commonwealth " Journal of Southeast Asian
 History 10, no. 1 (March 1969): 69-94; Ian Hamill, "Winston Churchill a d the Singapore Naval
 Base, 1924-1929: A Gigantic Excuse for Building Up Armaments,1 "Journal of Southeast Asian
 Studies 11, no. 2 (September 1980): 277-86.
 4 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Japan's War Pattern," ny Times, 9 December 1941, p. 20; "Japanese Gain
 Quick Successes in Far-Flung War of the Pacific," ny Times, 21 December 1941, p. E4; "Bomb
 Hits Claimed," ny Times, 10 December 1941, p. 1; James MacDonald, "Blow Staggers London,"
 ny Times 11 December 1941, pp. 1, 10.
 5 F. Tillman urdin, "Tokyo Tanks Roll in Malay Jungle," ny Times, 13 December 1941, p. 1.
 6 Memora dum, "Rep rt on the Fall of Singapore," 25 April 1942, 3, cab 66/2 /7, United
 Kingd m National Archives [ ereafter ukna], Kew Gardens, London, England; Hanson
 W. Baldwin, "The Japanese in Malaya," ny Times, 14 January 1942, p. 4; "The Internatio al
 Situation," ny Times, 30 December 1941, p. 1; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten
 Armies: Britain's Asian Empire and the War with Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 116.
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 THE DOMINO LOGIC OF THE DARKEST MOMENT 217
 Times reported that Japanese forces had advanced over three hundred miles
 into Malaya in three weeks, a "penetration" both deep and "unbelievably rapid."7
 By 15 February 1942, the New York Times recorded British Prime Minister
 Winston Churchill bemoaning the fall of Singapore "under the shadow of a heavy
 and far-reaching military defeat" - he and leading u.s. officials believed this to
 be "the darkest moment of the war."8 As though in response, Japanese leaders
 renamed Singapore Shonan , the "Light of the South," and announced it was the
 "center [of] the southern part of [Japan's] East Asia sphere."9 With control of main-
 land Southeast Asia, Japan turned its military offensive against the Dutch colo-
 nies of Sumatra and Java, enclosing both within its pincers.10 By May, the Japanese
 had fully seized the Philippines from the United Statesand threatened Australia.11
 From this "darkest moment" of the Pacific War, this article will explain,
 emerged the underpinnings of u.s. policy toward Southeast Asia through the
 1970s. Japan's march through Southeast Asia established crucial antecedents of
 the domino logic, entwining race with both the u.s. struggle for ascendancy in
 the region and the threat communism posed to the colonial order. At base,
 Japanese imperialism had treated spectators and sufferers to a bloody preview
 of how Asian communism, pouring out of a new China, might bring Southeast
 Asia under its command. In the shared memory of u.s. and British policymak-
 ers, Japan's war machine had fused together in interconnected insecurity the
 bastions of white power; it had imposed upon Southeast Asia the condition
 that one state's vulnerabilities impinged upon the stability of its neighbor. But
 after Japan became an ally of the United States following World War II, China
 instead slipped into the skin of the Yellow Peril, ensuring that the new struggle
 in Southeast Asia reprised what historian John W. Dower has described as a
 Pacific conflict between Asiatic and white empires.12
 7 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Three Weeks in the Pacific," ny Times , 29 December 1941, p. 4.
 8 Robert P. Post, "Premier is Somber: Calls Singapore Military Disaster" and James B. Reston,
 "Washington Sees Dire Blow in the East," ny Times , 16 Feb 1942, p. 1.
 9 "Japanese Rename Singapore Shonan," ny Times, 18 February 1942, p. 4; "Japanese Troops
 Go on Parade in 'Shonan' Today," Chicago Tribune , 18 February 1942, p. 4. Historian John
 W. Dower translates "Shonan" as "Radiant South" in War Without Mercy: Race and Power in
 the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 213.
 10 "Japanese Pour Ashore" and "Singapore to Sumatra," ny Times, 16 February 1942, pp. 2, 16;
 "Japanese Closing Pincers on Java," ny Times, 18 February 1942, p. 4.
 1 1 Larry Rue, "Shall We Save Burma or Java? British Problem. Danger to Australia and China
 Admitted," Chicago Tribune, 18 February 1942, p. 3; "Battles in Pacific Believed Nearing,"
 ny Times, 2 May 1942, p. 4; Alexander D. Noyes, "Market Falls on Corregidor Surrender," NY
 Times , 11 May 1942, p. 23.
 1 2 Dower, War Without Mercy, 308-11.
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 As the Chinese Revolution began to crest in 1949, Secretary of State Dean
 G. Acheson submitted a report to the National Security Council (nsc) stating
 that t e Chinese Communists would leverage the pervasive "anti-white Asiatic
 zenophobia [s/c]" in Southeast Asia and marshal millions of agents in the
 region - the Chinese diaspora - to subvert Western colonialism rom within.13
 In explaining to u.s. policymakers the challenges that the United States faced
 i  Southeast Asia, Acheson set the terms for u.s. Cold War policy in that region,
 terms that alluded to Japan's sweeping b t short-lived supremacy in the
 Western Pacific. Acheson's report, titled "NSC-51: u.s. policy toward Southeast
 Asia," presented what histo ian Fredrik Logevall considers an early version of
 the domino theory.14 The rudimentary domino logic had long been in play
 within u.s. and British strategic visions of S utheast Asia when in April 1954
 President Dwight D. Eisenhower would express in the domino imagery his own
 idiosyncratic vision of the region's interconnected insecurity.
 Given the significance of the domino theory in history of u.s. foreign rela-
 tions, it is surprisi g that istorical studies of t e theory's origins remain few
 and dated. Frank Ninkovich's Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino
 Theory in the Twentieth Century co stitutes the one historical monograph dedi-
 cated to the subject.15 At twent -years old, Ninkovich's study is also the most
 recent work on the subject. He contends that since American leaders "psycho-
 logically defined" the Cold War as "a  exercise i  maintaini g credibility and
 world opinio ," senior u.s. policymakers thought it was imperative to resist
 any aggressor's expansionist tendencies or else risk their nation losing interna-
 tional legitimacy a d global influence. The domino principle, Ninkovich
 argues, originated exclusively within the United States early i  the 20th Century,
 when President Woodrow Wilson attempte  to orient the nation toward an
 active, internationalist role in shaping global politics.16
 Ninkovich is persuasive for the most part. But, like many historians, as well
 as political scientists, he has sought the sources of the domino logic far from
 the fraught history of Southeast Asia in the early 20t  Century, distant from the
 13 Dean Acheson, "National Security Council [nsc] 51: u.s. Policy Toward Southeast Asia,"
 1 July 1949, Digital Natio al Security Archive [hereafter dnsa], 2, 4-5; Marilyn Lake and
 Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Color Line: W ite Men's Countries and the International
 Challenge of Racial Equality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4-6; Dower,
 War Without Mercy , p. 7; NSC-51, pp. 2, 4-5.
 1 4 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam
 (New Yor : Random House, 2012), 223.
 15 Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth
 Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
 16 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 65, 68, 192-3, 272, 276.
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 very arena to which Eisenhower would apply for the first time publicly the
 image of falling dominoes. Indeed, scholars have suggested that u.s. officials
 imposed the domino principle upon Southeast Asia having derived it from the
 "principal lesson of Munich" before World War II. After all, they emphasize,
 Anglo-American fears that Communist aggression against Greece and Turkey
 in 1946 would "infect Iran and Africa" and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's incor-
 poration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet orbit from 1944 through 1948 all
 were developments in Europe that predated the Communist triumph in China
 and North Korea's army invading South Korea.17 Such historical episodes
 implied that just one conquest never could sate the appetite of an aggressor,
 who, unless contained, inevitably would expand into contiguous areas.18 These
 insights exude explanatory power because they seemed applicable to virtually
 all situations where the United States intervened during the Cold War.
 Yet surely the last U.S. war in Southeast Asia shaped u.s. policymakers' Cold
 War visions of the region at least as much as the precedents of Nazi and Soviet
 aggrandizement, if not more. This article demonstrates, however, that u.s.
 policymakers instinctively mined their own vivid memories of Japan's recent
 conquest of Southeast Asia to divine the patterns of Chinese imperialism in
 the region. American memories of the Japanese Yellow Peril's string of victo-
 ries over the colonial powers animated the domino logic in u.s. policy and,
 crucially, its undeniable racial character, which all major studies of the domino
 theory have left unexamined. The British played a significant role as well, for
 u.s. officials consistently discussed with their counterparts their ominous
 17 Andrew J. Rotter, The Path To Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast
 Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 119-20. Charles S. Taber, Jerome Slater,
 and the late Betty Glad studied the domino theory as political scientists, producing a
 number of important studies. Betty Glad and Charles S. Taber, "Images, Learning, and the
 Decision to Use Force: The Domino Theory of the United States," in Betty Glad, ed., The
 Psychological Dimensions of War (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), 58-59;
 Jerome Slater, "The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam,"
 Security Studies 3, no. 2 (Winter 1993/94): 188-89. F°r suggestions that u.s. policymakers
 remained sanguine about China's fall to the Communists and instead preoccupied with
 Soviet advancements in Europe after World War II, see Douglas J. MacDonald, "The
 Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino
 Principle," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons : Strategic
 Beliefe and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University
 Press, 1991), 112-44. For another political scientist's analysis of the manner in which analo-
 gies such as preventing "another Munich" prefigured and shaped U.S. policy toward
 Vietnam, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the
 Vietnam Decisions of ig6§ (Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press, 1992).
 18 Rotter, Path To Vietnam , p. 120.
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 predictions of Chinese expansionism, learning with more dread than satisfac-
 tion that their British allies harbored similar thoughts given their experiences
 with the mostly Chinese guerrilla fighters of the Malayan Communist Party
 (mcp). The allies would reaffirm mutually each other's visions until hey
 acquired the ring of truth. During 1950, in frequent meetings between u.s. offi-
 cials visiting Southeast Asia a d British colonial authorities in Malaya and
 Singapore, an embryonic domino logic specific to the states of Southeast Asia
 co ealed rapidly. As a result, u.s. leaders formulated stra gy for the region in
 the early Cold War in f ar of the second c ming of the "darkest mom nt" that
  Allies had experienced during World War II.
 In what t e Alli s assumed about Japanese designs on Singapore, in the
 stakes they had placed on efending the island, a d among the rui s of the
 whit  empires in Southeast Asia were the building blocks f the domino l gic.
 T roughout 1941, as Japane e troops entered Indochina (by agreement with
 Vichy France), the Allies persuaded themselves that Japan planned to cap ure
 Singapore. On 4 January 1941, u.s. officials in Bangkok i formed Secretary of
 tate Cordell Hull that Japan would use Thail d as a "base for op r tions
 against Singapore."19 Days later, u.s. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew told
 Hull that Britain read Japanese operations in Indochina s a "s rious th at to
 Malaya and Singapore." In Februa y, Grew again sent word t  Hull that an
 attack o  Singapore was int g al to Japan's southward advance, explaining
 how this "strategically essential base" w s "fundamental" to the "immediate
 defense" of the British Empire.20 Churchill himself wrote to u.s. Presi ent
 Franklin D. Roosevelt that Japan desired Singapore.21 Ov r the following
 months, repetition hardened these predictions into truth. The Dutch govern-
 e -in-exil  war ed its allies in August hat Japan aimed at Singapore, the
 ost "desirable springboard" for a "thrust" at the East In ies.22 In Novemb r,
 Britain's am assador to the United S ates wro e to the State Department that
 he expected Japan to invade Thailand oon, encroach on th  Malay frontier,
 and lev l an "obvious threat" at Singapore.23
 19 Minister in Thailand (Hugh Gladney Grant) to the Secretary of State, 4 January 1941,
 Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter frus with approp iate year], /9 7, The Far
 East (Washington, dc: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1956), 5: 1.
 20 Ambassador i  Japan (Joseph C. Grew) to Secretary of State, 9 January 1941, ibid., pp. 8-9;
 Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State, 7 February 1941, ibid., p. 63.
 21 British Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) Letter to Presi ent Franklin D. Roosevelt,
 16 February 1941, ibid., p. 79.
 22 Memorandum of Conversation, Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile to
 Department of State, 6 August 1941, ibid., p. 261.
 23 British Embassy Note to the u.s. Department of State, 30 November 1941, ibid., p. 360.
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 Singapore's bloated significance to Allied strategy produced such per-
 ceptions. As Lauchlin Currie, one of Roosevelt's closest advisors, insisted in
 April 1941, Singapore was "key to the Indian Ocean, Australasia and Oceania ...
 indispensable to the continuation of Britain's war effort [as well as] Japan's
 dominance of the East." He counseled the president that the "defense of
 Singapore should be a cardinal feature of our strategy." And with respect to the
 recommendations he heard from Currie for the "best defense of Singapore,"
 Roosevelt learned the United States could "effectively tie up" - in a word,
 contain - Japan by "attacking Japanese shipping and airdromes in Indo-
 China."24 Even before the Japanese invaded Malaya, the Western allies had
 come to treat Singapore as a symbol of the interconnected security of the
 colonial order, as the "keystone" of Anglo-American strategy in the "Eastern
 Theatre."25 Within the u.s. fixations with Singapore during World War II lay
 the seeds of its future preoccupation with Vietnam and the containment of
 communism in Southeast Asia.
 American journalists also inflated the stakes of defending Singapore. From
 December 1941 until Singapore fell in February, newsmen claimed repeatedly
 that British and U.S. military planners considered the island Japan's "key objec-
 tive."26 They too named Singapore the "gateway to the Far East," the Indian
 Ocean, India itself, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia.27 Citing sources in the
 Anglo-American high command, u.s. journalists reported ad nauseam that
 Singapore was the "keystone of the strategic arch of the democracies of the Far
 24 Lauchlin Currie Letter to Roosevelt, 25 April 1941, frus, 1941, The British Commonwealth;
 the Near East and Africa (Washington, dc: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1959), 4:
 168-69.
 25 Memorandum, 24 December 1941, Annex 1 to ABC-4 and jccss-i: Washington War Con-
 ference, American-British Strategy, 5, compiled volume, "Arcadia," box 1, Combined Chiefs
 of Staff Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
 (hereafter ddel), Abilene, ks.
 26 F. Tillman Durdin, "Foe Seeks to Ring Singapore; Plan to Take it Intact Seen," ny Times ,
 28 December 1941, p. 1.
 27 "British Fall Back in Malaya Despite Australians' Attacks" and "Malaya Line Sags," ny
 Times , 30 January 1942, "Drive on Singapore," ny Times, 20 December 1941, p. 1; "Australia
 Fears Jap Drive," Chicago Tribune , 16 February 1942, p. 1; "The Meaning of Disasters," Time
 39, no. 8 (23 February 1942), 20. The Joint Chiefs of the British and American military
 planned to "prevent further Japanese penetration of the Southwestern Pacific Theater" by
 "establish [ing] security of essential land, air and sea communication" including
 "approaches to Singapore ... through the Dutch East Indies, to the Philippines." See Letter,
 24 December 1941, Annex 1 to jccss-4: Proposed Draft of Instructions to the Supreme
 Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater, 1-2, compiled volume, "Arcadia," box 1,
 Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, ddel.
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 East," the "keystone of the defense structure of the United Nations in the
 Sou hwestern Pacific," and the "keystone of all Allied plans for the Pacific War."28
 Few American newsmen ventured that losing Singapore fell "far short of deter-
 mining ultimate control of the Orient."29 On the front pages of papers such as
 the Chicago Daily Tribune , the Los A geles Times , and the N w York Times , the
 story of Southeast Asia's capitulation - its interconnected secu ity - warped
 ar und Singapore's fate. Well into January 1942, m st u.s. newspapers contin-
ued to call the island he "Gibral ar of the Pacific" or "Bastion of Far East."30
 These characterizations of Singapore were not new. A 1938 American-made
 film travelogue called Singapore the "most strategic point of the British
 Empire," for it lay at the "crossroads of India and Australia, South Africa and
 China." The film insisted that Singapore, as the "military base and home of the
 combined British Far Eastern Fleet," was "rightly ... the Gibraltar of the East." In
 a transparent retort to Japanese incursions into China at the time, as well the
 dista t rumblings of coming war in Eur pe, the film acclaimed Britain's mili-
 tary might. It mentioned the "regula  troops composed of Europea , Indian
 and Malay uni s" garrisoned in Singapore, and dwelled conspicuo sly long and
 without narration upon ranks a d ranks of marching Indian soldiers before
 asserting that Britain wned the "finest and most efficient air force in the Far
 East" a d airdromes "unrivalled in th  Orient."31 These taunts at Japan in fact
 betraye  Ame ican anxiety about the pow r of the Japanese forces, inscribing
 Sing pore with v in hope that Bri ain could repel the Yellow Pe il.
 After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in Decemb r 1941, British officials also
 repeatedly assured other Western nations that the island was "virtually unas-
 sailabl ."32 They bragg d that Si gapore's harbor was large enough to shelter
 the combined navies of the United Stat s and Britain and that its 18-inch guns
 28 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Japan's War Pattern," ny Times , 9 December 1941, p. 20; Hanson
 W. Baldwin, "Defeat at Sing pore," ny Times, 12 February 1942, p. 4; "Question Over
 Singapore," la Times , 12 February 1942, p. A4.
 29 "Editorial: he Battle of Singapore," la Ti es , 11 February 1942, p. A4.
 30 "Singapore Falls o Japs," la Times, 16 February 1942, p. 1; "Question Over Singapore," la
 Times, 12 February 1942, . 4A; "Singapore: Key to the Pacific," ny Times, 4 January 1942,
 p. rpi; "Britain's Fleet Secretly Built Up in Far Eas , Many Powerful Ships Face the Japs,"
 Chicago T ibu e, 8 December 1941, p. 18.
 31 Andre De La Varre, Singapore - Crossroads of the East, 1938, The Travel Film Archive,
 http://www.travelfil archive.com/item.php?id=io982&clip=n&num=io&startrow=o&
 keywords=Singapore (accessed 27 April 2013).
 32 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Defeat at Singapore," ny Times, 12 February 1942, p. 4; "Japan's War
 Pattern," ny Times, 9 Dec 1941, p. 20; Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and P ejudice: The Politics
 and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, co: Westvi w Press, 1988), 131-32.
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 "outranged anything at sea."33 Earlier that year, Britain's Ministry of Information
 even had sponsored a film British Movietone News produced titled Alert in the
 East that lavished cloying praise upon the "first class naval and air base[s]" of
 Singapore. With boasts soon soaked in irony, the film placed the island "strong-
 hold" at the "strategic center" of the Empire, asserting that its military installa-
 tions ensured the safety of all Britain's colonial possessions. The film's narrator
 proclaimed that Singapore's bases allowed India to remain "undistracted by
 self-defense," so safe that Britain could spirit India's "magnificent fighting men"
 to every other corner of the Empire. And this Empire operated on a gigantic
 scale. The film enumerated its far-flung possessions tied to Singapore's security
 guarantee, superimposing their names - Kenya, Egypt, Hong Kong, Fiji, Aden
 and Australia - upon footage of numerous deploying Indian and British
 troops. For Australian officers in Darwin, the sphere of security Singapore pro-
 jected allowed their peaceful relaxation on a patio under a thatched roof, the
 leisurely reading of newspapers, and the drinking of tea without a care for the
 unnamed threat "which may arise in the Far East."34 Intended as much for
 Britain's rivals and allies as its own imperial subjects, Alert in the East seemed
 contrived to assert that the British colossus astride the earth remained all-pow-
 erful. For the Allies it seemed ordained that in Singapore, white imperialism -
 with Britain its great champion - must make a fateful stand against Japan.
 Not to be outdone, Time magazine sexualized Singapore's strategic impor-
 tance. A week after Britain surrendered Singapore it designated the island the
 "key" that unlocked Britain's "seraglio" of colonies. Time framed Japan as a
 male sexual predator, whose "hot hand" pried the "key" from Britain's dead fin-
 gers, casting his lascivious "gleaming eye" upon Britain's defenseless feminized
 colonies. Time's writers left no mystery as to the rapist's lustful intent, for he
 "ogled bejeweled India ... peeped up the rippling skirts of the Indian Ocean ...
 [and] winked at little Madagascar."35 Time may have distinguished Japan from
 the rest of a feminized Orient, endowed it with masculinity enough to defeat
 the (presumably male) protector of India, but it still inscribed the Japanese
 man with animalistic urges to dehumanize him. In this Time was not unique.
 In his study War without Mercy, Dower has shown that jingoism was par for
 the course in numerous U.S. publications and government propaganda during
 33 "Drive on Singapore," ny Times, 20 December 1941, p. C18.
 34 Raymond Perrin (ed.), Alert in the East, 1941, British Movietone News, Ministry of
 Information, Great Britain, Colonial Film, http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/2467
 (accessed 30 April 2013).
 35 "Japs Eye Indies and India," Time 39, no. 8 (23 February 1942), p. 22.
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 World War II. More to the point, Time too approached Singapore's fate alive to
 interconnectedness of Britain's empire.
 By mid-1942, Japan's burgeoning East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had strung
 Southeast Asia from Indochina to the Dutch East Indies in permanent i ter-
 connected insecurity. Violating sovereign boundaries once resumed secure,
 and routing from north to south the armies charged with fortifying these lines
 scrawled upon maps, Japan had demonstrated that the weakness of any state
 in the region undermined t e security of its neighbor. Worse, strategic battle-
 fronts draw  by the Western nations in the region proved all but flimsy. When
 Japanese forces occupied Java, what the New York Times called the "final citadel
 of Dutch resistance," they already had run roughshod over the "Malay barrier,"
 which was that "line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java and North Australia [s/c]"
 ic  Britis  and U.S. military chiefs had chosen as their "basic defensive posi-
 tion ... to oppose the Japanese southward advance."36 From there, waters were
 f rded easily. Once apan conquered In onesia and the Philippines, hat
 Eisenhower later called the Allies' "island defensive chain" could be "turnfed] ...
 southward ... to threaten Australia and New Zealand."37 The Yellow Peril now
 was poised to strike Britain's white settler colonies.38
 American newsmen during World War II also foreshadowed to a fault the
 subsequent Cold War anxieties of u.s. policymakers regarding Indochina and
 Thailand. They decried the susceptibility of both to Japanese aggression. They
 deplored how Indochina had become a "springboard for further adventure"
 against Thailand and the British Empire.39 And they criticized "weakThailand's"
 failure to resist the Japanese army, how it had collaborated with Japan, ready-
 ing its southern airfields for Japanese troop insertions.40 In effect, Southeast
 Asia already resembled a row of dominoes in December 1941. After Indochina
 36 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Defeat at Singapore," NY Times , 12 February 1942, p. 4; "Java in
 Danger" The Economist , no. 5139, 21 February 1942, p. 248; United States - British Chiefs of
 Staff Report, 31 December 1941, Annex 2 to jccss-7: "Supporting Measures for the
 Southwest Pacific (the Far East Area and Adjacent Regions) until Establishment of
 Unified Command," compiled volume, "Arcadia," box 1, Combined Chiefs of Staff
 Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, ddel.
 37 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Presidential Press Conference, 7 April 1954, The American
 Presidency Project , http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=i0202 (accessed 16 April
 2012).
 38 Larry Rue, "Shall We Save Burma or Java? British Problem. Danger to Australia and China
 Admitted," Chicago Tribune , 18 February 1942, p. 3.
 39 "Japan Challenged," 7 December 1941, NY Times , p. Ei; "Editorial: Question Over Singapore,"
 la Times, 12 February 1942, p. A4.
 40 F. Tillman Durdin, "Tokyo Tanks Roll in Malay Jungle," 13 December 1941, ny Times, p. 1.
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 had toppled, the last went over quickly. And there was momentum to the pro-
 cess too. When Singapore fell, the New York Times reported how Washington
 had "conceded that Sumatra, too, must inevitably fall."41 Time , in turn, pre-
 dicted that once Japan took Sumatra, "very soon [it] would be at Java."42
 Southeast Asian security had become indivisible. Each state by yielding,
 infiltration, or invasion had opened the way for its neighbor's ruin. The day
 Singapore surrendered, the New York Times carried a depiction of the "aerial
 pattern of Japan's conquest" that demonstrated what Japan wrought. The
 graphic featured a map with a chain of overlapping spheres enveloping the
 countries of Southeast Asia. The Japanese attacks at the epicenter of each
 sphere radiated crises outward; where these spheres overlapped there were no
 borders. Its meaning was plain - no states could stand or fall discrete from
 each other, the collapse of one was deadly for all.43 This mindset helps explain
 why British planners remained engrossed throughout World War II with retak-
 ing Singapore by force. In 1943, British planners advocated to their American
 counterparts the "recapture of Singapore." They said it would shake Japan
 "psychologically]" and "electrify the Eastern world." They conjured for the
 Americans grandiose visions of driving Japan from Southeast Asia. From
 Singapore, they argued, Anglo-American forces could threaten Japanese com-
 munications to Thailand and Burma, attack Dutch oilfields directly, "flank and
 undermine the whole Japanese defense structure in Southeast Asia," and then
 launch operations to retake Hong Kong or Formosa, control the South China
 Sea and establish a sea supply route to China.44
 Whatever the direction the formative domino effect ran, it nestled deeper
 within Western strategic thought as the Pacific War progressed. Even disagree-
 ments between u.s. and British military planners illustrated the Allies' belief
 in the interconnectedness of Southeast Asia. u.s. military planners agreed
 with their counterparts in Britain that retaking Singapore affected all Japanese
 positions in Southeast Asia. From Singapore, they concurred, the Allies could
 unlock the South China Sea for u.s. -British forces to deploy against the
 Japanese navy. But Roosevelt and his military planners by 1943 had weaned
 themselves off obsessing with the island. Because Singapore did in fact possess
 41 James B. Reston, "Washington Sees Dire Blow in East," ny Times , 16 February 1942, p. 1.
 42 "Sumatra, Too," Time , 39, no. 8 (23 February 1942), 25.
 43 "Singapore Stormed," NY Times , 15 February 1942, p. Ei.
 44 Memorandum, 18 August 1943, Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 155-61 and
 Minutes, ist Meeting of the President and Prime Minister with the Combined chiefs of
 Staff, 19 August 1943, 402, compiled volume, "Quadrant Conference August 1943," box 2,
 Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, ddel.
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 strategic advantages, the Americans expected Japan to be deeply entrenched
 there - the island never could be a soft target and an Allied expeditio  there
 likely would become bogged down instead of rapidly embarking on other cam-
 paigns in the region. Until 1945, American planners rejected all Britis  sugges-
 tions to recapture Singapore, preferring to attack perceptibly weaker Japanese
 forces in Burma so as to connect Allied supply lines to Chiang Kai-shek's armies
 in China. If the Allies through Burma could batter Japan in China, the ripple
 effect upon Japanese positions in Southeast Asia would surely favor their side.45
 For a time, Churchill, unlike his military chiefs, shared the American focus
 on Burma. However in September 1944, he told Roosevelt t at the Allies should
 recover Singapore "in battle" rather than at the "peace table." C urchill spoke
 passionately about the necessity to "avenge" t e loss of Singapore. But Roosevelt
 disagreed, wishing to strike presumably weaker Japanese positions in Bangkok.
 He reminded the prime minister that Japanese forces on the island would be
 too stro g. A frustrated Churchill responded that "undoubtedly [there would]
 be a large force of Japanese" in Malaya a d Singapore, but he thought that it
 would boost American operatio s in the Pacific to "destroy" them t ere. The
 president sensed a protracted argument about Singapore looming and would
 not get embroiled. He said nothing, yielded the floor to the military advisors
 present, and the discussio  of Allied military strategy soon whirle  toward
 other topics.46 Churchill would be disappointed for almost a year.
 Yet Churchill and Roosevelt thought in similar ways about Southeast Asia's
 interconnectedness. Both believed that securing one corner of the region
 could shape the destinies of all its countries; they differed o ly over the loca-
 tion. T e British identified the region's cohesion (and their wounded pride)
 with the fall of Singapore, so they fixed upon the island. Roosevelt viewed
 Southeast Asia with a capacious sense of .s. national interests, treating
 American security as inseparable from the fate of other nations. According
 to historian Michael Sherry, once Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Roo-
 sevelt became sure that "when peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of
 all countries everywhere is in danger."47 Indeed, the Pacific war owerfully
 45 Summary Notes, 18 August 1943, Appendix: Appreciation and Outline Plan for the Defeat
 of Japan, 166, 169, compiled volume, "Quadrant Conference August 1943," box 2, Combined
 Chiefs of Staff Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, d d el.
 46 Minutes, First Plenary Meeting of Octagon Conference, 13 September 1944, 238-240, com-
 piled volume, "Octagon Conference September 1944" box 3, Combined Chiefs of Staff
 Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, ibid.
 47 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, ct:
 Yale University Press, 1995), 30, 32-3.
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 confirmed what he had intuited. And with the fall of Singapore, the New York
 Times echoed Roosevelt in treating Pearl Harbor and Singapore as interrelated
 losses, stating the Allies' fought an "indivisible war" against Japan. As if para-
 phrasing the president, the article also stated "a loss on any front immediately
 affect[ed] adversely the situation on all other fronts."48 These formulations of
 u.s. national security interests lived on in nsc-68, the landmark policy docu-
 ment of 1950 that for decades underpinned u.s. Cold War policy with dictums
 such as "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere."49
 Perhaps this expansive logic of global interconnectedness afforded the United
 States the latitude not available to the European powers fixed on regaining
 their colonies to pick choice spots for attacking Japan, latitude the United
 States lost in stages as it assumed its allies' burdens during the Cold War.
 Only in July 1945 did Churchill get his wish. With Burma more or less in
 Allied possession, the combined chiefs directed Lord Louis Mountbatten,
 Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia, to "open the Straits of Malacca
 at the earliest possible moment ... complete the liberation of Malaya ... capture
 key areas of Siam [and] establish bridgeheads in Java and Sumatra." These
 directives mandated recapturing Singapore as a base for Allied operations.50
 By then, Japan was weak and Singapore had become that soft target that u.s.
 planners sought. But President Harry S. Truman's decision to use atomic bombs
 on Japan in August, and Britain's returning victorious to Singapore a month
 later without firing a shot, rendered these plans moot.
 Moving ahead to the postwar period, after 1945, u.s. and British policymak-
 ers of the early Cold War consistently perceived Southeast Asian security
 through the prism of Japanese imperialism. Even the southward trail that
 Japan blazed through the region left an indelible mark upon u.s. and British
 decision-makers. When the Communists gained control in China in the fall of
 1949» the two Western allies became convinced that the new China's path to
 power must retrace Japan's - Indochina first, then Thailand, Malaya, and
 Singapore, followed by Indonesia and the Philippines before threatening
 Australia and New Zealand. Already in 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency
 (cia) had warned that the weakened colonial order in Southeast Asia was
 48 Lessons of the Pacific," ny Times , 17 February 1942, p. 20.
 49 Paul Nitze, "nsc 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security"
 14 April 1950, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm (accessed
 28 April 2013).
 50 Directive, 20 July 1945, Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
 (Southeast Asia), 176-8, compiled volume, "Terminal Conference July 1945," box 3, Com-
 bined Chiefs of Staff Conference Proceedings, 1941-5, ddel.
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 vulnerable to Communist attack.51 Such an attack seemed imminent, as John
 Dower notes, when China replaced Japa  as the main u.s. enemy in Asia.52
 With ease the Americans imagined that the Chinese menace, comprised of
 armies invading from the north a d fifth columns embedded within each state,
 marched to the martial drumbeat of the Japanese so recently silenced.
 In August 1950, State Department officials returned from fact-fi ding mis-
 sions to Southeast Asia convinced that the "Japanese had demonstrated the
 way" the Communist Chinese would invade the region. The military men on
 these missions concluded alike that if they "take Indochina ... Thailand would
 soon fall," making it easy for C inese forces to "come down the [Malay] penin-
 sula as the Japs did in the last war."53 American officials at t e u.s. embassy in
 Indonesia concurred. They too invoked the Japa ese invasion as a way to com-
 prehend and express their fears of Chinese commu ism. In September 1950,
 the u.s. ambassador in Jakarta reported to the State Department that a
 Communist-controlled Indonesia would ease "communist penetration" of the
 Philippi es and the vital bases of A stralia, "as was demonstrated when t e
 Japanese mou ted their greatest threat" to Western interests in the Pacific dur-
 ing World War II from the Indonesian islands.54
 British strategists held the same thoughts. To be sure, Britain's Office of
 Foreign Affairs predicted that the C inese Communist Party (ccp) would seek
 chiefly to stimulate "conspiracy against and subversion" of the governments in
 Southeast Asia. Since it lacked military prowess comparable to the Japanese in
 World War II, they reasoned, the ccp was "unlikely" at that time to pursue mili-
 tary aggression be ond its southern frontier. Yet when these same British offi-
 cials pondered the details of Chinese foreign policy, they insisted China would
 retrace the Japanese campaign. They made this disconnected conclusio  when
 nothing in China's use of conspirac  and subversion demanded it must follow
 a systematically southward course through mainla d Southeast Asia. Britain's
 51 Central Intelligence Agency [cia], "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires its implica-
 tions for u.s. Security," 3 September 1948, 6, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of
 Information Act Electronic Reading Room [hereafter cia foia].
 52 Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 310.
 53 Report, "Malaya," n.d., State Department - Joint m dap Survey Mission to Southeast Asia,
 9; eport, " alaya," 17 August 1950, u.s. Navy - Joint m dap Surve  issio  in Southeast
 Asia, 16, folder "Melby - Chronological File 1950 (Aug 1-15)," (Chronological File),
 May-December 1950, box 12, Papers of John Melby (hereafter Melby Papers), Harry
 S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter stl), Independence, mo.
 54 H. Merle Cochran Report to John F. Melby, "I donesia: Information Desired by Survey
 Mission," 22 September 1950, 3, folder "Melby - Chronological File 1950 (Sept 16-30),"
 (Chronological File), May-December 1950, box 12, ibid.
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 secretary of state for foreign affairs even informed the Cabinet that every-
 one on his team "agreed that Indo-China ... would probably be the immedi-
 ate objective of Communist action." The British thus looked first to Japan's
 original launching pad, despite acknowledging Thailand's outstanding "strate-
 gic importance" with respect to the region, for it bordered Burma, French
 Indochina, and British Malaya. They locked onto Indochina even after not-
 ing that independent Burma suffered from "chaotic" civil strife that "rendered
 [it] ... acutely vulnerable to infiltration and exploitation by the Chinese
 communists."55
 For British officials, the persistence of memory went even further. After
 Indochina, they fully "expected" China to do as the Japanese had done and
 "overthrow the existing regimes in Siam and Burma" before turning its atten-
 tion toward Malaya, Singapore and eventually, India.56 Because the British
 leaders believed Malaya and Singapore to be the prizes Communist China
 sought (since this had been true of Japan before), they cast their strategy from
 the past, drawing the Cold War battlefront at the French colonies from which
 Japan had entered Thailand. Even a decade after losing Singapore to Japan,
 Britain's Chiefs of Staff still formulated the Empire's "Defense Policy and Global
 Strategy" with that "darkest moment" in mind. Recalling a pattern of expan-
 sion all too familiar, the chiefs calculated that China would aim first for the "fall
 of Indo-China to Communism," and then "inevitably" (and in sequence) target
 Thailand, then Burma, before preying on Malaya and Singapore.57
 Australia also figured in this British picture of insecurity. During World War
 II, the danger to Australia had seemed so immediate after the fall of Singapore
 that British officials consequently situated Southeast Asia and Australia within
 the same strategic space. Sir William Strang, under secretary for foreign affairs,
 in his March 1949 report on Southeast Asia, reminded his colleagues that
 Singapore was an "indispensable link in communications with Australia," a
 link so intimate that when Strang visited Singapore earlier that year, he could
 55 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Memorandum to the Cabinet, 26 November
 1949» CAB 129/37, 2-3, UKNA.
 56 Ibid.
 57 "Defense Policy and Global Strategy - Report by The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff,"
 9 July 1952, 13, PREM 11/49, UKNA. By 1949, the British government had decided that
 Hong Kong could not remain its choice outpost against Communist China. Its proximity
 to the mainland and the ease with which Communist agents could infiltrate it, meant
 Malaya (for its rubber production representing Britain's largest dollar earner) and
 Singapore (for its naval and air bases) were the more logical focus for Britain in preserving
 its imperial interests in East Asia. See Conclusions of Meeting, "China and Southeast
 Asia," 8 March 1949, cab 128/15, ukna.
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 not help but "feel [himself] there within the sphere of Australian interest."58
 Across the Atlantic, Dean Acheson held t e same view. In NSC-51 (penned as
 Strang produced his report), Acheson argued that if Southeast Asia were ever
 "swept by communism," this "major political rouť meant a "critically exposed
 Australia."59
 So when President Truman dispatched three fact-finding missions to
 Southeast Asia between December 1949 and August 1950, u.s. and British offi-
 cials encountered each other as though trapped in an echo chamber. They con-
 firmed each other's strategic visions of Southeast Asia in the Cold War. As
 historians Mark Atwood Lawrence and Andrew J. Rotter have shown, both
 French and British officials labored through the late 1940s to talk their American
 cou terparts into giving economic and military aid to the French in Indochina,
 though equally u.s. policymakers heeded their allies' arguments si ce they
 melded with American strategic assessments of Southeast Asia after the
 Chinese revolution.60 In all three u.s. missions to Indochina - under Philip
 C. Jessup, R. Allen Griffin, and John F. Melby - that Truman sent to the region,
 u.s. officials analyzed Southeast Asia through their memories a d impressions
 of Japanese expansionism, re-inscribing t e embryonic domino logic of the
 "darkest moment" onto the reports that they later filed. At the same time, u.s.
 officials above all sought British analysis of regional developments, discover-
 ing that British thoug ts mirrored their own. In any case, the British consid-
 ered these u.s. missions rare opportunities to have their allies see - through
 British eyes - "the South East Asian picture correctly."61 In the echo chamber
 the two allies' s ared memories of Japan's victories caused their Cold War
 assessments of Southeast Asia to converge.
 Thus, the British role in reifying the domino logic demands close scrutiny.
 Moreover, the records of the Jessup, Griffin an  Melby missions - named
 after their leaders - suggest that u.s. officials paid more attention to British
 58 Sir William Strang, "Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East," 17 March 1949, cab 129/33,
 11, UKNA.
 59 NSC-51, pp. 5-6.
 60 For a study of the British role in convincing the United States to support the French, see
 Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam : Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast
 Asia (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 1987). For the French role (as well as a discus-
 sion of Britain's) that few American historians have studied, see Mark Atwood Lawrence,
 Assuming the Burden : Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Berkeley:
 University of California Press, 2005).
 61 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Memorandum to the Cabinet, 26 November 1949,
 cab 129/37, 4 a°d Foreign Office Telegram to Washington, 13 July 1952, 1-2, prem 11/49,
 UKNA.
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 colonial administrators in Malaya and Singapore than to Asian leaders
 or the French in Indochina. Malcolm MacDonald, the loquacious British
 Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, had much to do with this. He shared
 his views so copiously that the records of the visits of u.s. officials to Malaya
 and Singapore are somewhat thicker than records of their visits elsewhere in
 the region. Then again, the Americans did prefer to legitimate their views with
 British opinions. For one, Colonel R. Allen Griffin, leader of the second mis-
 sion, sought from the British - especially MacDonald, for whom he had "great
 respect" - clarity about how the United States could meet Southeast Asia's
 security needs. Griffin believed that "you had to talk with the British if you
 were to understand" the region since "you never found an American who knew
 anything, in that part of the world."62 He also personally assured Assistant
 Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk that "the British analyses of
 the situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole were similar to
 those which he and his mission developed."63
 In fact Griffin's recommendations to the State Department, laced with
 MacDonald's perspectives, proved critical to the first steps that the United
 States took toward involvement in Vietnam. Citing the importance of Griffin's
 reports to the president's decision, Rusk in April 1950 informed Under Secretary
 of State James E. Webb that Truman had reserved $36.5 million for military
 assistance projects in Indonesia, Indochina, Thailand, and Japan. The presi-
 dent also sought another $5 million for Indochina and other increases in
 military aid to Indochina from the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.64
 Because of views they shared in common with the British, American suspi-
 cions coalesced into conviction, and conviction into imperatives.
 Therefore, on 23 March 1950, when Ambassador Jessup reported on the first
 mission's findings to the two Deans - Acheson and Rusk - he stressed his con-
 clusions were "in accord" with those of British officials in Malaya and Singapore.
 Many of Jessup's insights drew from the views of MacDonald, who Jessup
 referred to as "McD." Jessup echoed McD's opinion that Indochina was "key to
 the situation" in Southeast Asia, specifically the region's "military weakness in
 meeting Communist guerrillas" in "hot wars" like those raging in Indochina,
 62 Colonel R. Allen Griffin Oral History, 15 February 1974, 59, Oral History Program, hstl.
 63 Record, "Interdepartmental Meeting on the Far East at the Department of State,"
 11 May 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific (u.s. Government Printing Office, 1976),
 6: p. 89.
 64 Dean Rusk Memorandum to James E. Webb, Budgetary Plans for Fiscal Year 1951 for
 Assistance ot Countries Eligible Under Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act,
 25 April 1950, FRUS, /950, 6, pp. 83-84.
 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS 21 (2014) 215-245
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Sat, 18 Apr 2020 02:53:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 232 NGOEI
 Malaya, and Burma.65 According to Jessup, McD contended that "if Indochina
 or Burma fell to the communists, it wo ld be very easy for them [the Commu-
 nists] to sweep over the Thais who were most unlikely to resist."66 Whether
 paraphrasing or elaborating McD, Jessup's own expressions recalled how
 American newspapers during World War II characterized Thailand's collabora-
 tion with Japan, claiming that "weak" Thailand, which e qualified was the
 "British view also," would "not attempt to stand up" against communist aggres-
 sion.67 In a section of his report entitled "The Weaknesses of O r 'Friends',"
 Jessup stated that McD ad identified a troubling "Asia  psychology" that left
 them susceptible to Communist aggression if the Western powers did nothing.
 With the authoritative perspectives of the colonial powers (the British above
 all), Jessup proposed that the United States should take "all measures ... to pre-
 vent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia."68
 By July 1950, when the third mission with John Melby as its leader arrived at
 its first stop, Saigon, the belief that Indochina was a gateway for communism's
 sweep into Southeast Asia had reverberated through the Atlantic echo cham-
 ber enough to sound like fact.69 At any rate, Truman had decided in May,
 a mo th before the outbreak of the Korean Wa , that the containment of
 Asian communism required the United States aid the French i  Indochina.70
 In August, Melby and Major General Graves B. Erskine, chief of the military
 65 Among others, Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup also visited Afghanistan, Burma,
 For osa, India, Japan and Pakistan. Memorandum of Conversation, "Oral Report by
 Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup upon his return from the East," 3 April 1950, ibid.,
 p. 68.
 66 Memorandum of Conversation, "Conference at Commissioner General's at Bukit Serene,"
 6 February 1950, ibid., p. 11.
 67 Memorandum of Conversation, "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup
 upon his return from the East," pp. 69-71; Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) Telegram
 to the Secretary of State, 27 February 1950, frus, 1950, 6, p. 29. For the same expression
 "weak Thailand" see for example, F. Tillman Durdin, "Tokyo Tanks Roll in Malay Jungle,"
 13 December 1941, NY Times, p. 1.
 68 Jessup also noted that Leon Pignon, the French High Commissioner for Indochina,
 offered more or less the same insight Memorandum of Conversation, "Oral Report by
 Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup upon his return from the East," 3 April 1950, frus,
 1950, 6, p. 68.
 69 Melby Mission in Indochina Schedule, 17 July 1950, folder "Melby Mission File, File #1, 1950
 (May-July)," Chronological File (1950 May-December), box 12, Melby Papers, hstl.
 70 U.S. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-6 7 (Pentagon Papers),
 Book I, Part IV, Section A, ii, quoted in Andrew J. Rotter, "The Triangular Route to Vietnam:
 The United States, Great Britain and Southeast Asia, 1945-1950," The International History
 Review 5, no. 3 (August 1984): 404.
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 group on the mission, submitted to the U.S. government that it was "almost
 a commonplace, now, to state that failure in Indochina" to contain commu-
 nism would "make well nigh inevitable the over-all and eventual victory of
 Communism throughout the area."71 U.S. actions and beliefs now reflected
 complete acceptance of the domino logic derived from "the darkest moment"
 during World War II.
 Anglo-American memories of the Japanese Yellow Peril also infused the for-
 mative domino logic with a racial character that carried into the Cold War. As
 Dower has documented, in the mutual "race hate [that] fed atrocities" on the
 battlefield and the "impression of a truly Manichean struggle between com-
 pletely incompatible antagonists," race was intertwined with the contest for
 power in the region.72 This white-Asiatic antipathy segued easily into the gath-
 ering Euro-American hostility toward Communist-controlled China and extant
 distrust of the Chinese diaspora. Indeed, Britain for decades had believed that
 the large Chinese populations in its colonies of Malaya and Singapore were
 "racially, culturally and politically ... bound to the mother country China" and
 these Chinese constituted an impenetrable "'Imperium in Imperio,' a 'State
 within a State'."73 For their part u.s. policymakers had considered the Chinese
 diaspora of Southeast Asia a major source of regional instability even before
 the Communists established control of China. Policymakers of both the United
 States and Britain thus presumed the overseas Chinese could serve as China's
 fifth column, just as the u.s. government once had thought all Japanese-
 Americans potential agents for Tokyo.74 In line with this reasoning, the fact-
 finding missions to Southeast Asia Jessup and Griffin led took the revealing
 step of producing for the Truman administration a chart detailing the distribu-
 tion of ethnic Chinese across the region, state by state. The explanations
 accompanying the chart described the Chinese as an "alien and unassimilated
 group" in Southeast Asia, an "entering vehicle for infiltration of Communism"
 71 Melby and General Graves B. Erskine Report to fmacc [Foreign Military Assistance
 Correlation Committee], Joint State-Defense m dap [Mutual Defense Appropriations Pro-
 gram] Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, 6 August 1950, 4-5, folder "Melby Chronological
 File File #1, 1950 (May-July)," Chronological File (1950 May-December), box 12, Melby
 Papers, hstl.
 72 Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 9, 10-11, 29, 72-3.
 73 J.E.M Mitchell (for Chief of the Intelligence Staff, British Pacific Fleet) to Staff Officer
 (Intelligence) Singapore Area, "The Post War Emigration Policy of China," 27 August 1947,
 1, FCO 141/16975, UKNA.
 74 Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 5; Memorandum of Conversation, "Oral Report by
 Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup upon his return from the East," 3 April 1950,
 pp. 70-71.
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 into the region.75 It was critical to know the enemy's numbers and where they
 resided.
 How Americans viewed the Chinese in the late 1940s was not surprising.
 istorians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have uncovered a history of white
 hatred of the Chi ese in the United States, Britain, and Australia with descrip-
 tions of violent local and transnational racist reactions to the Chinese immi-
 grant workers entering these countries in 1800s. White Americans, British, and
 Australians for years before World War II already had designated "Chinamen"
 as the original Yellow Peril.76 For them, rediscovering their first race hate, an
 older flame, proved easy. Acheson's NSC-51, for example, considered the
 Chinese of Southeast Asia a contagion that "afflict[ed] the entire region," a
 problem made "doubly ominous" by the ccp's role in supporting and guiding
 the Communist movements in Southeast Asia. He worried especially that
 Southeast Asia's Chinese became more enamored by the day of how the ccp
 "waxed enormously in strength," fearing that with such advantages "Chinese
 penetration" of the region would be "a simple matter." Acheson even thought
 Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asian communism the greater threat to u.s.
 interests in the region than Soviet influence.77
 Likewise, British officials like Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Strang
 maintained that the "darker side" of the "Far Eastern picture" was how the
 Communist revolution in China and anti-colonial impulses might inspire
 the "great Chinese communities" across Southeast Asia to oppose Western
 interests.78 Britain worried intensely that a mass movement of the Chinese
 in Malaya and Singapore might overrun their authority. And Jessup, based
 on his meetings with McDonald, reiterated to the State Department what
 the Atlantic allies believed in common - that Southeast Asia's "overseas
 Chinese communities formfed] one of the most important elements in
 75 Mutual Defense Assistance Program Chart, "South and Southeast Asia: Chart 11-
 Distribution of Chinese," n.d., folder "State Department, Correspondence, 1949 [3 of 3],
 box 40, White House Confidential File (whcf), State Department Correspondence,
 Papers of Harry S. Truman (hereafter Truman Papers), hstl.
 76 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Color Line, pp. 9-10. Chapter 1 provides excellent
 coverage of Chinese immigration to the United States and the interconnected construc-
 tion and inspiration for white solidarity between the United States, Australia, and other
 white settler nations. See also, Erika Lee, At America's Gates : Chinese Immigration during
 the Exclusion Era, 1882-^43 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003);
 Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor Immigration and the Anti-Chinese
 Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
 77 NSC-51, pp. 1-4, 5-6.
 78 CAB 129/33, P- 2.
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 the strength of the Communists in Asia" and could power Chinese
 expansionism.79
 In what appeared a logical leap, Jessup stated that countries with strong
 local Chinese communities were as much in danger as those sharing "common
 borders" with China. But Jessup's assessment illustrates how profoundly race
 influenced American and British approaches to the Cold War in Asia. The abid-
 ing suspicions that u.s. and British policymakers directed against the overseas
 Chinese reinforced the idea of interconnectedness that was at the core of the
 domino logic; they explain why the United States often treated the Southeast
 Asian countries as strategically indistinguishable from each other. For u.s.
 leaders at least, what real differences existed between Southeast Asian coun-
 tries ultimately paled in significance, and offered little obstruction, should
 China turn the ten million overseas Chinese into its weapon against the
 Western powers. No wonder Jessup believed a country's large Chinese com-
 munity, like those of Malaya and Singapore, even when physically discon-
 nected from the mainland, was tantamount to sharing a common (and porous)
 border with China. These suspicions survived well into the 1950s, shaping u.s.
 strategy in the region. Eisenhower administration policymakers consistently
 spilled ink over plans for the Taiwanese leadership to wrest the loyalties of
 Malayan and Singaporean Chinese away from China's mainland regime.80
 Fredrik Logevall has argued in Embers of War that the domino theory "egre-
 giously" approached the countries of Southeast Asia as if they "had no indi-
 viduality, no history of their own, no unique circumstances in social, political,
 and economic life that differentiated from their neighbors." But these were not
 merely simplifications arising from what Logevall labels the "apocalyptic anti-
 Communism" infecting the Truman administration thanks to Senator Joseph
 McCarthy.81 These Cold War fears did not work alone. Rather, they united pow-
 erfully with American and British anxieties over race - their lasting dread of
 the original Yellow Peril - often overwhelming their recognition of each coun-
 try's differences. As such, u.s. and British policymakers did not ignore these
 distinctions as much as hold that race trumped sovereignty, a lesson they had
 79 Memorandum of Conversation, "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup
 upon his return from the East," pp. 70-71.
 80 Ibid.; John E. MacDonald (Operations Coordinating Board [ocb] Staff Representative on
 Taiwan and Government of the Republic of China [grc] Working Group) Memorandum
 to Ad Hoc Working Group on Overseas Chinese, "Summary of Operations Plans Affecting
 Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," 6 September 1957, 1-6, folder "Overseas Chinese [1]",
 White House Office, nsc Staff Papers, 1948-61, ocb Secretariat Series, box 5, ddel.
 8 1 Logevall, Embers of War, p. 223.
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 learned from the "darkest moment." Indeed, the specter of colonial collapse in
 the face of an Asiatic power would haunt and skew Anglo-American strategic
 thinking for years. If the much smaller outfits that had served as Japan's
 fifth column during World War II had combined to wreak such havoc, u.s.
 and British leaders could visualize easily large masses of Chinese intimately
 interconnected across (and despite) the borders of distinct Southeast Asian
 states. If the overseas Chinese linked arms with each other and the mainland,
 they could by sheer numbers pull the Western powers asunder. These were
 big ifs, but in the Atlantic echo chamber doubts shrank while the Yellow Peril
 loomed larger.
 On the day that Jessup delivered his recommendations to the State
 Department, Griffin had just completed his weeklong discussions with Mac-
 Donald in Malaya and Singapore.82 His mission had been to ascertain what
 "emergency economic and technical assistance" the u.s. could provide its
 allies in Southeast Asia, but his analyses often centered on the latent danger
 that Southeast Asia's Chinese posed to the colonial order. This concern
 MacDonald found easy to amplify, and Griffin to heed, given that Malaya's and
 Singapore's large Chinese populations troubled British colonial authorities.
 While the absolute numbers of ethnic Chinese residing in Thailand and
 Indonesia were higher than that of Malaya and Singapore combined, it was
 the proportion of Chinese in the populations of these British territories that
 unnerved Griffin. From its first sentence, Griffin's report about Malaya and
 Singapore counted both as a single unit and focused on how "almost half" of
 its population was Chinese. For Griffin, the Chinese problem in Malaya and
 Singapore was of special significance. Like the British, he believed that the
 Chinese diaspora pledged "deep underlying" and "primary loyalty ... to China."83
 He echoed the ideas already circulating in the u.s. security establishment.
 82 Jessup delivered his oral report to members of the State Department and other u.s. offi-
 cials (including George F. Kennan) on 23 March 1950. The Griffin Mission visited Malaya
 and Singapore between 16 and 23 March 1950. R. Allen riffin's itinerary included
 Indochina (6 to 16 March), Burma (23 March to 4 pril), Thailand (4 to 12 April), and
 Indonesia (12 to 22 April). Samuel P. Hayes, Griffin's chosen deputy for the mission, has
 written an account of what they experienced. Samuel P. Hayes, The Beginning of
 American Aid to Southeast Asia : The Griffin Mission of 1950 (Lexington, MA: Lexington
 Heath Books, 1971).
 83 R. Allen Griffin to State Department, Report No. 2 of the United States Economic Survey
 Mission to Southeast Asia: Needs for United States Economic and Technical Aid in the
 Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, May 1950, iii-iv, 1-7, folder "Southeast
 Asia File, General - 1950-1952," Southeast Asia File, Miscellaneous File, box 9, Melby
 Papers, hstl.
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 The Central Intelligence Group (precursor to the cia) in 1946 had deemed the
 "4,500, 000 alien Chinese and millions more persons of part-Chinese blood" as
 a "potential tool for the extension of China's influence in Southeast Asia,"
 whether it was that of the ccp or the Guomindang (gmd).84 By 1950, when the
 ccp ruled China and the Chinese of Southeast Asia had swelled to twice
 that number, the prospects facing the United States and its allies became that
 much darker.
 For Griffin, the Chinese problem in Malaya and Singapore was of special
 significance. Britain had been fighting the guerrillas of the mcp since 1948, a
 battle-hardened group that had mounted anti-Japanese resistance throughout
 World War II, sought to unify Malaya and Singapore under a Communist gov-
 ernment, and was comprised ninety-five percent of ethnic Chinese. Griffin
 reported that the m CP's "campaign of violence" aimed to "drive Europeans
 away and disrupt the government and economic activities" in both Malaya and
 Singapore. He emphasized the international implications of the mcp's attacks
 on both European civilians and British rubber and tin plantations in Malaya.
 He reminded the State Department that Malaya was Britain's largest net dollar
 earner, generating forty-five percent of the world's natural rubber and thirty-
 four percent of the world's tin. Should the "sinister and effective" mcp derail
 Malayan production of rubber and tin, two items high on the u.s. strategic
 commodity list, Britain would struggle to contribute to the Cold War effort in
 Europe as well as Asia.85
 Moreover, Griffin believed the mcp's violent acts remained on the uptick
 despite the increased suppression operations that British forces had mounted.
 This was to be expected, he surmised, because Malaya and Singapore with
 their large Chinese populations presented "peculiarly inviting target [s]" for
 Communist aggression "either from within or without." As Griffin repeated
 several times, Chinese residents "already outnumbered] the Malays" and
 Indians in Malaya and Singapore. So if the Chinese Communists assaulted
 Malaya directly, or if Malaya's Chinese joined with Beijing, this outpost of the
 British Empire must "fall to the Communists." In Griffin's opinion, Chinese
 Communists abroad and locally then would control the major British military
 bases in Singapore, which meant thereafter "Burma, Thailand and Indonesia
 would face greatly increased Communist pressure."86
 84 Central Intelligence Group, "Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia," 2 December 1946,
 1-2, 7, CIA foia.
 85 Griffin to State Department, Report No. 2 of the United States Economic Survey Mission
 to Southeast Asia, May 1950, pp. iv, 2-4.
 86 Ibid.
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 After listening to MacDonald worry aloud about the Chinese populations of
 Malaya and Singapore, Griffin bound his remarks about Burma, Thailand, and
 Indonesia to the perceived Chinese threat, focusing on an invasion from the
 "mother country," Chinese subversion from within, or both in combination.87
 Griffin's reports demonstrate the imaginative work u.s. policy akers per-
 formed in acknowledging the unique conditions of each country in Southeast
 Asia, while diminishing those distinctive features. For example, Griffin readily
 acknowledged that Burma faced a spectrum of proble s unrelated to the
 Chinese threat: its largest minority group - the Karens - struggled against the
 government for an autonomous state. Moreover, the size of Burma's Chinese
 population was small compared to that of Malaya and Singapore. Thus, Griffin's
 report on Burma focused on a Chinese invasion. He argued that Burma's "prox-
 imity with Co munist China" constituted the "principal factor" in the coun-
 try's foreign relations, in particular its "undefined and frequently disputed
 border" with China. Griffin considered Burma an "attractive goal for Chinese
 expansion," a "pathway ... from Southern Yunnan province to Thailand and
 Indo-chi a."88 From Thailand and Indochina, the Chinese could follow the
 path that the Japanese had plotted before them during World War II.
 Griffin certainly had Japanese imperialism on his mind. When it came to
 Thailand, Griffin deplored the Thai "record of World War II," specifically its
 accommodation with the rising power in the region based on its "estimate of
 who is likely to win." This "precedent" meant that the Thais would collaborate
 ith China and, like they once did for Japan, facilitate Chinese incursions into
 Southeast Asia.89 A week after visiting with MacDonald, Griffin cabled Acheson
 from Bangkok, stating that Thailand like the rest of Southeast Asia was "threat-
 ened by Communist imperialism controlled from China, which makes no
 secret [of its] designs" on the region. He eyed warily Thailand's "large Chinese
 minority [of] about 3 million ... susceptible [to] use" by a China "already exert-
 ing pressure."90 With mounting anxiety Griffin described Thailand's "well-
 organized Chinese Communist Party" and the successful collaboration in
 87 Ibid., p. 1.
 88 R. Allen Griffin to State Department, Report No. 3 of the United States Economic Survey
 Mission to Southeast Asia: Needs for United States Economic and Technical Aid in Burma,
 ay 1950, 1, 3, folder "Southeast Asia File, General - 1950-1952," Southeast Asia File,
 Miscellaneous File, box 9, Melby Papers, hstl.
 89 R. Allen Griffin to State Department, Report No. 4 of the United States Economic Survey
 Mission to Southeast Asia: Needs for United States Economic and Technical Aid in
 Thailand, May 1950, ii, 3, folder "Southeast Asia File, General - 1950-1952," Southeast Asia
 File, Miscellaneous File, box 9, Melby Papers, hstl.
 90 Stanton to Secretary of State, 12 April 1950, frus, 1950, 6, p. 79.
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 propaganda and subversion between the Chinese and Thai converts to
 communism.91
 In Griffin's mind, Indonesia was not safe from the Chinese either. Indonesia's
 coastal areas remained, for him, "susceptible to easy Communist penetration
 from the mainland." Griffin again drew parallels between the current situation
 and World War II. He used familiar terms from u.s. war planning during World
 War II, reminding the State Department that the Indonesian archipelago and
 the Malayan Peninsula formed the "Malay Barrier between the Indian and
 Pacific Oceans" - the barrier that Japan once breached and China now endan-
 gered. His analyses distorted by his racial lens, Griffin acknowledged, but
 skated past, the unique characteristics of Indonesia. Though Indonesia had a
 population of some 75 million in 1950, Griffin zeroed in on the country's
 Chinese "minority of nearly two million," which he thought an internal
 Communist threat if China utilized it.92 Griffin's treatment of Indonesia best
 illustrates the overpowering assumptions that the Americans harbored with
 regard to the Chinese menace. It mattered less that Indonesian-Chinese did
 not control the national government or that native Javanese and Sumatrans
 outnumbered them by some twenty to one. What had warped Griffin's assess-
 ment of the newly independent country was not just the presence of two mil-
 lion Chinese in Indonesia, but how the Chinese of Malaya and Singapore were
 destabilizing British rule.
 The reports that the Melby team submitted did not simply reiterate the con-
 clusions of its Jessup and Griffin counterparts. What its members learned in
 Indochina, Malaya, and Singapore definitively anchored the ideas about
 Southeast Asian insecurity that had been coalescing since 1942. Moreover, the
 Melby team's encounter with British colonial officials offered u.s. policymak-
 ers the most developed enunciation of the early domino logic, nodding at
 its origins in World War II and the importance of race in its vision of the
 Communist threat to Southeast Asia. Also, this final mission to the region
 boasted personnel with substantial expertise in war making and diplomacy in
 Asia. General Erskine had led the military campaigns against Japan at Saipan
 and Iwo Jima, to name only two, and these experiences augmented his recom-
 mendations for u.s. policy in East Asia. Diplomat Melby had served as a u.s.
 91 Griffin to State Department, Report No. 4 of the United States Economic Survey Mission
 to Southeast Asia, May 1950, pp. ii, 3.
 92 R. Allen Griffin to State Department, Report No. 5 of the United States Economic Survey
 Mission to Southeast Asia: Needs for United States Economic and Technical Aid in
 Indonesia, May 1950, ii, 2-3, 9, folder "Southeast Asia File, General - 1950-1952," Southeast
 Asia File, Miscellaneous File, box 9, Melby Papers, hstl.
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 diplomat in China from 1944 to 1948, and was the principal author of the China
 White Paper i  1949 that (in more than a thousand ages) detailed the past
 century of u.s. policy toward China. His i sights into Chinese relations with
 Southeast Asia carried eight in the State Department and with Rusk espe-
 cially, under whom he served as special assistant.
 Erskine's report on Indochina contained only bleak forecasts. After three
 wee s in the colonies, he judged that the French had made "little progress"
 ineffectively fighting t e Viet Min . The people of In ochina, from his view,
 harbored "deep-seated hatred and distrust" for the French, feelings Commu-
 nist propaganda fanned that goa ed "the Oriental to 'push the white man o t
 of Asia™ - echoes of the "anti-white Asiatic zen phobia" that NSC-51 main-
 tained was the legacy of Japan's East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.93 The French
 command admitted to Erskine that it "was unable to fight on two fronts, the
 Viet Mi h and the Chinese frontier." Erskine agreed, reporting that the "Chinese
 thrust" into Indochi a could occur through any of "three historic invasion
 routes from the north and n rthwest." Only u.s. military assistance to the
 French "on a considerable scale," he advised, would help them in countering
 the appeal of c mmunism in Sout east Asia.94 With his uni peachable mili-
 tary credentials, Erskine's views validated both the Truman administration's
 commitment to French I dochina and fears that China would invade Southeas
 Asia. His e dorsement sufficed until 19 October 1950 hen China's entry into
 the Korean War confirmed, or so u.s. leaders thought, that i a planned to
 expand militarily i to Indochina and the rest of Asia.95
 Melby's reco ds suggest that he and Erskine came away from discussions
 with MacDonal  and other British officials i  August 1950 with possibly the
 earliest coherent and comprehensive articulation of the domino logic.96 Aside
 93 Graves B. Erskine Summary Report, Military Group Joint m dap Survey Mission to
 Southeast Asia, 5 August 1950, 3-4, 13-15, folder "Melby Mission File, File #1, 1950 ( ay-
 luly)," Chronological File (1950 May-December), box 12, Melby Papers, hstl.
 94 Ibid., 3-4.
 95 cia, "Critical Situations in the Far East," 12 October 1950 and "National Intelligence
 Estimate-2: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," 6 November 1950, ii, cia foia.
 The Central Intelligence Agency's October 1950 estimate of critical situations in the Far
 East discussed the possibility of "full Chinese Communist intervention in Korea," the
 "threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa," and the "Threat of Chinese
 Communist Invasion of Indochina." See also, Rotter, Path to Vietnam , especially chapter 9,
 "The Korean Intervention and After."
 96 Malcolm MacDonald's version certainly did not offer original ideas, but the manner in
 which he synthesized them on 8 August 1950 in Johor, Malaya, represents the first time
 (in u.s. government records) that the domino logic received so cogent a presentation.
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 from the piecemeal gestures that U.S. and British officials had made to its com-
 ponent parts in previous years, the vision had not been synthesized or
 expressed with as much cogency until the Melby team's conference with
 MacDonald. On 8 August, when Melby invited him to offer his "views on [the]
 situation" in the region, MacDonald launched into his most developed por-
 trayal of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia. To begin, he referred to the
 ongoing Korean War, suggesting over two months before the fact that China
 would intervene there. When neither Melby nor Erskine challenged this pre-
 diction, MacDonald talked about China threatening Southeast Asia in turn. He
 stated that if in Korea China's expansionist "design is successful ... Indo-China
 is next." Even if China ultimately chose not to use force, MacDonald reasoned
 that it could destroy Western power "by proxy, linking up with the local fifth
 column" that operated "in every one of these countries - Burma, Indo-China,
 Siam and Malaya," fifth columns driven by "first, all the communists, and sec-
 ondly, all the Chinese community." He quickly explained that China would
 strike Indochina first because "as a result of the colonial rule continuing there,
 there is a very powerful nationalist movement, a large part of which is under
 the control of the communists."97 MacDonald in just minutes had linked pos-
 sible Chinese invasion to the importance of Indochina, and awkwardly con-
 flated Communists with overseas Chinese in his description of China's fifth
 column.
 But MacDonald was not done. He next focused on China's potential aggres-
 sion toward Malaya, the country he called the "great prize" of the region
 because of its tin and rubber. He expected the Americans to recall Japan's pur-
 suit of Malaya's natural resources and how Malaya fell to Japan during World
 War II. For China to conquer Malaya, he argued, Indochina would be the "place
 of attack ... the highway to the rest of South East Asia," for "if Indo-China falls
 Siam would be easier to 'pick up." Siam, he contended, "wouldn't resist at all."
 The shared memories of World War II finished the job for him: after Siam,
 Malaya, and then Singapore - the pregnable fortress. If the Americans had not
 yet tapped their memories of World War II, MacDonald explicitly harked back
 to how the Thais had once yielded to the Japanese and would do so again when
 Fredrik Logevall's detailed account of American, British, and French articulations of
 the domino principle suggests that after the somewhat vague expressions of it contained
 in NSC-51 in July 1949, the next obvious enunciation came from General Jean de Lattre de
 Tassigny in August 1951 (ny Times, 26 August 1951). Logevall, Embers of War, p. 263.
 97 Transcript, Bukit Serene Conference, 8 August 1950, 1, 3, folder "Melby Chronological
 File 1950 (August 1-15)," Chronological File (1950 May-December), box 12, Melby
 Papers, h st.
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 the Chinese were at their gates.98 This statement had the desired effect. State
 Department officials agreed with MacDonald that "Thai officials and the Thai
 public would be apt to seek some accommodation with communism" if the
 West appeared "unable to counter-act" China's advance. They co curred t at
 Thailand's "record vis-à-vis the Japanese in World War II [was] a precedent" of
 great relevance to the Cold War."
 According to transcripts of the Malaya conference, Melby and Erskine let
 MacDonald have free run of t e floor. And MacDonald seized the opportunity
 to hammer ome his view:
 Indo-China is the place where Communists ... would want to conquer
 i  their plans for South East Asia. If I do-China holds, all holds. Indo-
 China is top priority ... and we should give it first place in all our
 considerations.
 He then made quick work of explaining the difficulties France faced with the
 Viet Minh before he got back on track, declaring that "the Communists are
 working very hard to make war this autumn ... training large numbers of
 Vietminh troops in China." Once again, "route through Indo-China and Siam is
 the route," he stated. "We expect trouble in October or November." At this
 point, Melby and Erskine signaled their assent with more than silence. They
 pitched in to confirm their collective suspicions. Melby shared that intelli-
 gence gathered in Hong Kong indicated i October was "the invasion date" and
 that the United States knew that 30,000 Viet Minh already had been trained
 and organized in China. Then Erskine chipped in. He explained the weak-
 nesses of the French defenses and forces, admitting the French "are not in a
 good position [and] if the Chinese make any movement southward ... the
 northern [French] force (in Tonkin) would be practically annihilated."100
 Neither Melby nor Erskine needed to verbalize the horror they expected to fol-
 low the obliteration of their French ally. The Americans had found in
 MacDonald the great communicator of what they had wanted to hear.
 In the days that followed the conference in Malaya, Melby increasingly
 would frame Indochina's problems and their impact on Malaya in the terms
 that MacDonald had presented. On 10 August, he told the Malay Mail that
 98 Ibid.
 99 U.S. State Department, "Report of the Joint m dap Survey Mission to Southeast Asia -
 Thailand," 30 September 1950, 5, folder "Melby - Chronological File 1950 (Sept 16-30)"
 Chronological File (1950 May-December), box 12, Melby Papers, hstl.
 100 Transcript, Bukit Serene Conference, pp. 3-5.
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 "should Indochina fall to the communists, followed by Burma and Siam,
 Malaya's position would be critical indeed." The Singapore Standard reported
 the same day that Melby had no doubt that "the Chinese Communists will
 march over the borders" into Indochina. Even Singapore's leftist Chinese news-
 paper the Nan Chiao Jit Pao recorded Melby saying that "Indo-China was under
 the threat of New China's troops," but commented that it was "laughable" how
 the American was "unable to quote any evidence" in support of his state-
 ment.101 On hindsight, it would seem that MacDonald's vivid portrayals of
 Southeast Asia's insecurity provided all the evidence that Melby needed.
 Indeed, before the Nan Chiao Jit Pao confronted him, he had asked MacDonald
 and General Sir John Harding, British commander-in-chief of Far East Land
 Forces, for "any evidence" that the Malayan Communists were benefiting from
 "political guidance" outside of Malaya. Harding had confirmed the mcp
 received "guidance from Peking." But MacDonald, with his proclivity for
 graphic detail, gave Harding's statement motion and substance. He described
 how Chinese messengers traveled throughout Southeast Asia, communicating
 with the mcp not by radio (for that image would seem too remote), but in per-
 son in "Bangkok, Hong Kong, much through the [Soviet] Embassy in Bangkok."
 One sentence in a letter that Melby sent weeks later to his personal friend in
 the State Department expresses MacDonald's influence best: "Malaya has been
 the most stimulating experience and Malcolm MacDonald the most construc-
 tive man I have talked with."102
 No wonder that the reports members of the Melby team submitted bore the
 distinctly recognizable marks of MacDonald's influence. State Department
 officers that had accompanied Melby pondered the possibility of China mount-
 ing an "overland invasion of Malaya" explicitly using the example of Japan, and
 even amplified MacDonald's hints and suggestions. They concluded that such
 an invasion could come only along Malaya's "northern frontier" as with the
 "last war," and that defending Malaya would be impossible if a Chinese south-
 ward drive, like the Japanese, already had forced "one or more other Southeast
 101 "American Mission/' Malay Mail , 11 August 1950; "Appropriate Aid for Malaya to be
 Recommended - Melby," Singapore Standard , 10 August 1950; "Leader of u.s. Far East
 Military Aid Mission Makes Groundless Statement that Chinese Troops Threaten
 Indo-China. But Unable to Name Evidence to Support Statement," Nan Chiao Jit Pao, 10
 August 1950. The colonial authorities of Singapore shut down the paper just over a month
 later on 20 September. "Singapore Paper Banned," Cairns Post [Queensland, Australia],
 22 September 1950.
 102 Melby Letter to John Paton Davies (Policy Planning Staff, Department of State), 31 August
 1950, 2, folder "Melby - Chronological File, 1950 (Aug 16-31)," Chronological File (1950
 May-December), box 12, Melby Papers, hstl.
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 Asian countries ... [to] succumb."103 The U.S. Navy echoed this prediction.
 They used the "Japs" campaign as a means of visualizing the pat  of China, a d
 cited MacDonald to ground their contention that the Chinese "enemy lan
 forces" would first conquer Indochina, causing T ailand to fall, bringing the
 danger "right across the border" to Malaya.104 If the idea of interconnected
 insecurity among Southeast Asian states previously had been a free-floating
 concept for u.s. officials, it rapidly gained mass as British officers reiterated it
 with choice words. Like MacDonald, Harding had stated emphatically that
 Malayan security "lies in the defe se of the frontier of Indo-China," and the
 fate of the two countries in the Cold War was "closely interlocked ... and
 cannot be separated."105
 A d so with the Melby team the domino logic returned to the United States
 fully formed, awaiting only the specific metaphor that Eisenhower later pro-
 vided. Subsequent enunciations of the domino logic from American, British or
 French leaders after the Melby-Erskine-MacDonald encounter, while impor-
 tant, often merely retreaded the principles and imagery that already had con-
 gealed for u.s. policymakers. Logevall suggests that after Acheson's submission
 of NSC-51 in July 1949, it was French Hi h Commissioner and Commander-i -
 Chief of Indochina General de Lattre who in late August 1951 publicly declared
 t at "Tonkin is the keystone of the defe se of Southeast Asia," and that "if
 Tonkin falls, Siam falls with Burma and Malaya is dangerously compro-
 mised."106 In fact, De Lattre likely adopted this formulation from discussions
 with British officials like MacDonald and Harding in Singapore in June 1951, for
 attendees at that conference later confided in Assista t Secretary of State Rusk
 that the Frenchman took at "full value" the following recommendations of the
 Singapore Co ference: "Tonkin is the key to all of Southeast Asia and were it to
 fall to the commu ists the area as a whole would be lost."107
 In any case, in October 1950, mont s before de Lattre convened with
 MacDonald and Harding in Singapore - the Allies' once upon a time "keystone
 103 u.s. State Department, "Report of the Joint m dap Survey Mission to Southeast Asia -
 Malaya," n.d., 1, 9, folder "Melby - Chronological File, 1950 (Aug 1-15)," ibid.
 104 Report, u.s. Navy-Joint m dap Survey Mission in Southeast Asia, "Malaya," 17 August 1950,
 16, ibid.
 105 Transcript, "Phoenix Park Conference, Singapore," 9 August 1950, 8, ibid.
 106 Logevall, Embers of War, p. 263; Michael James, "De Lattre of Rhine, Danube and Tonkin,"
 26 August 1951, NY Times, pp. SM11-12.
 107 "Vital Singapore Conference on Red Threat," Examiner [Tasmania], 14 May 1951;
 Memorandum of Conversation, G. McMurtrie II Godley (Office of Western European
 Affairs) for Rusk, 29 August 1951, frus 1951, Asia and the Pacific (u.s. Government Printing
 Office, 1977), 6, Part 1: 489.
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 in the arch" - the cia had already built upon the findings of the Melby mission
 and installed the domino principle in its strategic vision of Southeast Asia in
 the Cold War:
 The fall of Indochina would provide the Communists with a staging area
 in addition to China for military operations against the rest of mainland
 Southeast Asia, and this threat might well inspire accommodation in
 both Thailand and Burma. Assuming Thailand's loss, the already consid-
 erable difficulty faced by the British in maintaining security in Malaya
 would be greatly aggravated.108
 To all intents and purposes, u.s. policy toward Southeast Asia was cast.
 In January 1953, the imagery Eisenhower employed in his inaugural address
 seemed just a step away from the domino metaphor he would coin in April the
 following year. Not halfway into his speech, the new president would proclaim
 common cause with the nation's French and British allies. He spoke of the
 "common dignity" of European and American soldiers that fought the Cold
 War in Asia, who fell (in a single sentence) one by one to unseen Asian ene-
 mies. In this vein, "the French soldier who dies in Indo-China, the British sol-
 dier killed in Malaya, the American life given in Korea" that he described were
 all linked, and in more ways than one.109 The order in which Eisenhower chose
 to refer to these fighting men, their deaths occurring from north to south in
 mainland Southeast Asia before encroaching upon u.s. interests in the broader
 region, reveals how intensely the new president believed in the interconnected
 vulnerability of Western interests. That these soldiers were obviously white
 fighting men dying in foreign fields expressed his conviction that u.s. Cold War
 objectives mandated protecting the colonial order and from non-whites at
 that. Eisenhower's row of white protectors vividly depicted the dynamic of fall-
 ing dominoes, the first knocked over in Indochina making it certain the last
 would go over very quickly. By the time he was asked to explain the "strategic
 importance of Indochina to the free world" in April 1954, the "falling domino"
 principle he offered constituted only the latest incarnation of ideas that had
 been circulating since the "darkest moment" of World War II.
 108 CIA, "Consequences to the U.S. of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia,"
 13 October 1950, 1-2, cia foia.
 109 Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address, 20 January 1953, Bartleby, http://www
 .bartleby.com/124/pres54.html (accessed 10 June 2013).
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